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In the landscape of European countries, the United Kingdom stands out for not 
having an entrenched written Constitution. Until recently, the protection of 
human rights was entrusted mainly to Parliament and to the common law tradi-
tion of civil liberties through the dialogue and, at times, tension between the 
two fundamental principles of the British Constitution: the principle of parlia-
mentary sovereignty and the rule of law.1 In 1998 a new age began: the Human 
Rights Act (HRA) was adopted to become the “cornerstone” of the new consti-
tutional settlement designed by New Labour at the end of the last century2 and 
a prominent means of human rights protection. It was the instrument incorpo-
rating the European Convention on Human Rights, and was also largely ac-
knowledged as a Bill of Rights for the UK, embodying an original new model 
of commonwealth constitutionalism.3 
The Act was intended to “bring rights home”, enabling those (private indi-
viduals and organizations) who may have suffered an infringement of their 
Convention rights by public authorities to have those rights enforced and claim 
their redress in domestic courts and not only by recourse to the European Court 
in Strasbourg. The HRA also provides national judges with the opportunity to 
contribute to the development of human rights jurisprudence in Europe by en-
gaging in a dialogue with the Strasbourg Court. To these ends, the Act envis-
ages a range of provisions formally consistent with the principle of parliamen-
tary sovereignty.4 Under the Act, courts may employ effective interpretative 
instruments to ensure compatibility of legislation with Convention rights and 
                                                 
1  For an extensive account of human rights protection prior to the HRA and according 
to the common law tradition, see J. BEATSON, S. GROSZ, T. HICKMAN, R. SINGH, S. 
PALMER, Human Rights: Judicial Protection in the United Kingdom, London, 2008. 
2  V. BOGDANOR, The New British Constitution, Oxford, 2009, in particular 50 ss. 
3  This diverges from the “judicial supremacy” paradigm of the American-style judicial 
review, in so far that it leaves the last word in the field of human rights protection to 
the legislature rather than to the courts, which are not empowered under the Act to 
strike down legislation contrary to human rights. See S. GARDBAUM, Reassessing the 
New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, in: Int. Jnl. of Constitutional Law, 
2010, 167 ss.; Id., How Successful and Distinctive is the Human Rights Act? An Ex-
patriate Comparatist's Assessment, in 74 M.L.R., 2011, 195 ss. 
4  A principle which finds its traditional theorization in the well-known work of A.V. 
Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, London, 1885. On 
the relationship between the HRA, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and 
the rule of law, see extensively: J.W.F. ALLISON, The English Historical Constitu-
tion. Continuity, Change and European Effects, Cambridge, 2007 e V. BOGDANOR, 
The New British Constitution, cit.  
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may pronounce a declaration of incompatibility whenever a compatible inter-
pretation is not possible.  
Throughout its relatively short life, the HRA has been the target of fierce 
criticism from the political milieu and sectors of the media, and its fate is cur-
rently under debate. In March 2011 the coalition government resulting from 
the 2010 general election appointed a Commission to investigate the future of 
the Act and the creation of a domestic Bill of Rights. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to explore, in the light of the HRA framework and its applicative history, 
the terms of the current debate on a possible move from the HRA to a new 
home-grown instrument of human rights protection. 
II. The HRA Operative Framework: an Overview 
According to its long title, the HRA’s main purpose is “to give further effect to 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human 
Rights”. To this end, the Act presents a complex set of operative provisions: 
the interpretative obligations under Section (s.) 2 requiring courts to take 
Strasbourg jurisprudence into account and s. 3 requiring public authorities to 
construe legislation and give it effect in a way which is compatible with Con-
vention rights “so far as it is possible to do so”; the “declaration of incompati-
bility” instrument (s. 4); a duty of public authorities to act compatibly with the 
Convention rights under s. 6, which extends and enriches both the grounds and 
the powers of judicial review over public authority action;5 the provisions con-
cerning standing and judicial remedies in ss. 7 and 8, which tend to reproduce 
at a national level the same parameters of protection found in Articles 34 (no-
tion of victim) and 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention system. In addition 
to these instruments of judicial control, the Act also provides the opportunity 
for an extrajudicial, political review of legislation. Section 19 of the Act re-
quires any minister in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament to make a 
                                                 
5  Most of the claims under s. 6 have been brought through the judicial review proce-
dure, even though that is not the only way of enforcing Convention rights against 
public authorities. In more general terms, s. 7(1) provides that a person who is (or 
would be) a victim of an unlawful act can bring proceedings “in the appropriate 
court or tribunal” or rely upon the Convention right concerned “in any legal pro-
ceedings”. In observance of the sovereignty of Parliament, according to s. 6(4) and 
(6), a “public authority” does not include either House of Parliament and an “act” 
does not include a failure to legislate or to adopt a remedial measure. ‘Public author-
ity’ for the purposes of s. 6 does include ‘a court or tribunal’. This has contributed to 
overcoming a merely vertical approach to Convention rights effects and to recogniz-
ing indirect horizontal effects in proceedings between private parties.  
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statement - before the Second Reading of the Bill, either to the effect that in his 
view the provisions of the Bill comply with the Convention rights (‘a state-
ment of compatibility’) or to the effect that although he is not able to make a 
statement of compatibility, the government nevertheless wishes the House to 
proceed with the Bill. Section 19 statements have so far represented an oppor-
tunity for Parliament to engage in human rights debate in the course of the law-
making process.6 
Crucial to the HRA judicial control mechanism are the interpretative obliga-
tions in s. 2 and s. 3 and their interplay with s. 4 ‘declarations of incompatibility’. 
Section 2(1) sets the terms of dialogue between domestic courts and Stras-
bourg, requiring that in determining a question which has arisen in connection 
with a Convention right, a court or tribunal must take into account any judg-
ment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, any opinion or decision of the former Commission or decision of 
the Committee of Ministers, whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion 
of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question 
has arisen. According to s. 2 HRA and unlike s. 3 of the European Community 
Act 1972 with respect to the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, Stras-
bourg case law is not binding but merely persuasive. The ratio of the provision 
can be clearly found in the parliamentary debates on the Human Rights Bill: s. 
2(1) was conceived to allow domestic courts to develop their interpretative ap-
proach and contribute to the development of human rights law in Europe while 
keeping Strasbourg jurisprudence as a constant point of reference. Notwith-
standing the terms of s. 2 and its source of inspiration, the House of Lords has 
until recently promoted a ‘precedent-like approach’7 to the Strasbourg case 
law, according to which, in the absence of special circumstances,8 courts 
                                                 
6  Section 19 ministerial statements are not binding, nor have any persuasive authority, 
on the courts when considering compatibility of legislation: see R v. A [2002] 1 AC 
45, para 69. 
7  I. LEIGH, R. MASTERMAN, Making Rights Real. The Human Rights Act in its First 
Decade, Oxford, 2008, 66. This approach does not affect the doctrine of stare decisis 
since domestic lower courts are still bound to follow higher courts’ precedents even 
if they conflict with later Strasbourg authority: see Kay v. Lambeth LBC [2006] 
UKHL 10. 
8  “Special circumstances” were found to occur where decisions of the European Court 
compel a “conclusion fundamentally at odds with the distribution of powers under 
the British constitution”: see R (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) 
v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2002] 2 AC 
295, para. 76, Lord Hoffmann; where the Strasbourg Court “has misunderstood or 
has been misinformed about some aspects of English Law”, or has not had “all the 
help which was needed to form a conclusion”: cfr. R. v. Lyons (No. 3) [2003] 1 AC 
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should follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the European Court. 
Otherwise, it was said, the case may proceed to the Strasbourg Court, which is 
likely to follow its constant jurisprudence.9 
A strict application of this approach (referred to as the ‘mirror principle’ 
because it requires domestic protection of rights to reflect the standards devel-
oped in the supranational context),10 has until recently discouraged a protection 
of Convention rights more generous than that developed in Strasbourg.11 Re-
cent case law seems to afford a more limited scope of application to this con-
troversial approach12 and rather to promote a more independent domestic juris-
prudence. In the re P case, concerning the issue of adoption of children by 
unmarried couples, the Law Lords decisively endorsed a ‘margin of apprecia-
tion exception’13 affirming that domestic courts may develop an autonomous 
                                                                                                                                                     
976, para. 46, R v. Spear and others [2003] 1 AC 734, para. 12. 
9  Alconbury cit., para. 26, Lord Slynn. 
10  See Lord Nicholls in R (on the application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v. Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] 1 AC 529, para 34; J. LEWIS, 
The European Ceiling on Human Rights, in P.L., 2007, 720 ss. 
11  See Lord Bingham in the Ullah case; “It is of course open to member states to pro-
vide for rights more generous than those guaranteed by the Convention, but such 
provision should not be the product of interpretation of the Convention by national 
courts […] The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurispru-
dence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less”: R v. Special Adjudica-
tor, ex p Ullah [2004] UKHL 26, para 20. This approach was endorsed as a corollary 
of the traditional principle according to which courts are bound to construe legisla-
tion in a way which does not put the United Kingdom in breach of its international 
obligations (Lord Hoffman in In re P and others (AP) (Appellants) (Northern Ire-
land) [2008] UKHL 38, para 35) but was also intended to shield the judiciary from 
the suspicion of excessive judicial activism: cfr. N. KRISCH, The Open Architecture 
of European Human Rights Law, 71 M.L.R., 2008, 183 ss, at 205; R. MASTERMAN, 
Aspiration or foundation? The status of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the ‘Con-
vention rights’ in domestic law, in H. FENWICK, G. PHILLIPSON and R. MASTERMAN 
(eds.), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act, Cambridge, 2007, 78 ss. 
12  Commentators have criticized the ‘mirror approach’ as finding no foundation in the 
Convention, whose standards represent a “floor” not a “ceiling” for human rights 
protection throughout Europe, and as hampering the development of a domestic ju-
risprudence in the field of human rights: cfr. L. LEWIS, The European Ceiling on 
Human Rights, cit.; F. KLUG, H. WILDBORE, Follow or lead? The Human Rights Act 
and the European Court of Human Rights, in E.H.R.L.R., 2010, 621 ss. In the par-
liamentary debates leading to the adoption of the HRA it was clearly recognized that 
the European Convention constitutes a “floor of rights”: see Hansard, HL vol. 583, 
col. 510, November 18, 1997. 
13  For earlier conflicting judicial references to this exception see M. AMOS, The princi-
ple of comity and the relationship between British courts and the European Court of 
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interpretative approach in fields in which the European Court has recognized 
member states a margin of appreciation.14 The Supreme Court, which suc-
ceeded the Appellate Committee in October 2009, seems willing to fully ex-
ploit the opportunities of dialogue with the Strasbourg Court which s. 2(1) 
HRA affords. In R v. Horncastle,15 a case concerning the admissibility of hear-
say evidence, the Court departed from the approach of the European Court in 
Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. United Kingdom.16 The Supreme Court points out 
that giving the European Court “the opportunity to reconsider the particular 
aspect of the decision that is in issue”, is likely to help promote a “valuable 
dialogue” between them, as indeed happened with the Grand Chamber judg-
ment delivered on 15 December 2011.17 
S. 3 was intended by the promoters of the Act as a crucial feature of the 
HRA’s mechanism: a strong interpretative obligation which would have made 
a “declaration of incompatibility” a rare event, an instrument of last resort. The 
                                                                                                                                                     
Human Rights, in Yearbook of European Law, 2009, 503 ss., at 508 ss. 
14  [2008] UKHL 38. 
15  [2009] UKSC 14, conceding that “[t]he requirement ‘to take into account’ the Stras-
bourg jurisprudence will normally result in this court applying principles that are 
clearly established by the Strasbourg Court”, the Court also recognized that it can 
depart from Strasbourg jurisprudence, giving reasons for adopting such a course, in 
the rare instances where it “has concerns as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg 
Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of our domestic 
process”: [2008] UKHL 38, para 11. 
16  Chamber judgment, 20 January 2009, (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 1. 
17  [2008] UKHL 38, para. 11. The Grand Chamber in its recent judgment has disagreed 
in part with the Chamber and held that “where a hearsay statement is the sole or de-
cisive evidence against a defendant, its admission as evidence does not automatically 
result in a breach of Article 6 § 1” (para 147), as long as there are sufficient counter-
balancing factors and safeguards in place.  
See also Manchester City Council v. Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, in which the Supreme 
Court finally followed Strasbourg jurisprudence in the field of eviction guarantees, de-
parting from a long conflicting line of House of Lords precedents, and nevertheless re-
stated the persuasive nature of Strasbourg authority: “This court is not bound to follow 
every decision of the EurCtHR. Not only would it be impractical to do so: it would 
sometimes be inappropriate, as it would destroy the ability of the Court to engage in 
the constructive dialogue with the EurCtHR which is of value to the development of 
Convention law […] Of course, we should usually follow a clear and constant line of 
decisions by the EurCtHR […] But we are not actually bound to do so or (in theory, at 
least) to follow a decision of the Grand Chamber […] Where, however, there is a clear 
and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some fundamental 
substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to 
overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider that it 
would be wrong for this Court not to follow that line”: para 48. 
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provision requires that “So far as it is possible to do so, primary and subordi-
nate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible 
with the Convention rights”. This obligation is binding on all public authorities 
(not only the judiciary) and applies to legislation whenever enacted, whether 
before or after the HRA. 
In the judicial context, s. 3 has contributed to a further extension of the pur-
posive approach to statutory construction over the more traditional literal ap-
proach. According to the principles developed in HRA case law, s. 3 allows 
courts to depart from the literal meaning of a provision and even to adopt a 
linguistically strained interpretation by reading in additional words or reading 
down words, if necessary, to render it compatible with Convention rights. 
What section 3 does not permit is adopting an interpretation which conflicts 
with a provision expressly limiting a Convention right, or which is inconsistent 
with a “fundamental feature” of the legislation to be interpreted.18 A compliant 
construction in these cases would cross the line between interpretation and 
amendment and would impinge on the sphere of competence of the legislator.19 
Inconsistency with fundamental features of legislation is not the only crite-
rion for discarding s. 3. Courts also tend to dismiss this remedy where such a 
course would come into conflict with the traditional restraints and limitations 
of the judicial role, and where it would entail decisions judges are not 
equipped for, or which go beyond their constitutional competence. For in-
stance, courts decline to employ section 3(1) HRA where the resulting decision 
would: have financial and source allocation implications;20 require the intro-
duction of new procedures;21 imply extensive enquiry and wide public consul-
tation and discussion;22 have wider ramifications in collateral normative areas 
which cannot be dealt with in the incremental “peacemeal fashion” of judicial 
law making,23 or have the effect of bringing about a change in the relationship 
between institutional powers and their respective spheres of competence.24 In 
                                                 
18  The current judicial approach to s. 3(1) has been defined by the House of Lords in the 
leading case Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557. On this case see A. 
KAVANAGH, Choosing between sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998: judi-
cial reasoning after Ghaidan v. Mendoza, in: H. FENWICK, G. PHILLIPSON and R. 
MASTERMAN (eds.), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act, cit., 114 ss.  
19  Ghaidan cit., para 30 ss. 
20  See Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan) [2002] 2 AC 291.  
21  Ibidem. 
22  See Bellinger v. Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 437, para 37. 
23  Ibidem, para 45.  
24  See R (on the application of Anderson) v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment [2003] 1 AC 837. 
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all these instances courts will have to consider making a declaration under sec-
tion 4 HRA, leaving the necessary steps to achieve compatibility to the other 
branches of government. 
The judicial practice of the first HRA decade has confirmed the “declara-
tion of incompatibility” as the last resort instrument that was originally in-
tended. The Government document Responding to human rights judgments, 
published in September 2011, reports twenty-seven declarations of incompati-
bility since the Act came into force, nineteen of which have become final while 
eight more have been overturned on appeal.25 
The main features of this instrument of judicial control were designed in a 
way that preserves the traditional principle of parliamentary supremacy. In 
fact, under the HRA scheme, courts are not empowered to invalidate provi-
sions of primary legislation incompatible with Convention rights, but only to 
issue a declaration of incompatibility,26 which does not affect the validity, con-
tinuing operation or enforcement of the relevant provision and is not binding 
on the parties to the proceedings or on Parliament and Government.27 
The main effect of the declaration of incompatibility is to prompt Parlia-
ment and Government to act in order to remove the incompatibility by amend-
ing or repealing the provision at issue.28 While such a declaration has no bind-
ing effect, Government has so far always enacted consequent remedial meas-
ures, suggesting that the option “whether” to intervene is a very costly one in 
                                                 
25  Responding to human rights judgments. Report to the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights on the Government’s response to human rights judgments 2010-2011, Sep-
tember 2011, Cm 8162, updated on 8 August 2011. 
26  The power to make declarations of incompatibility is accorded only to courts (‘higher 
courts’) specifically referred to in s. 4(5): the House of Lords (now the Supreme 
Court), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, 
in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary sitting otherwise than as a trial court or the 
Court of Session, in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the High Court or the 
Court of Appeal, the Court of Protection in any matter being dealt with by the Presi-
dent of the Family Division, the Vice-Chancellor or a puisne judge of the High Court.  
27  The lack of binding and coercive effect has led the Strasbourg Court to reject the 
argument endorsed by the United Kingdom that a declaration of incompatibility is an 
effective remedy which the individual applicant must pursue in order to satisfy the 
admissibility requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies prescribed by art. 35 
of the European Convention: see the ECtHR’s decision in Hobbs v. United Kingdom, 
18 June 2002, the ECtHR’s judgment in Burden and Burden v. United Kingdom, 12 
December 2006, paras. 30-40 at para 39 and the Grand Chamber’s decision in the 
Burden case, 29 April 2008, at para 41. 
28  S. 10 and Schedule 2 provide for a fast-track procedure by which the executive can 
take remedial action. 
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political and institutional terms.29 
III. Merits and Limits of the Human Rights Act 
The merits of the HRA are generally recognized, even by most of its original 
critics, who feared the Act would have transferred a considerable portion of 
power from the democratically elected branches of government to the judici-
ary; the experience of this last decade has assuaged such concerns.30 
With regard to the interaction between national and supranational systems 
of human rights protection, the Act has worked efficiently as an instrument of 
incorporation of the European Convention in the domestic order: Convention 
law is gradually permeating every field of legal interest and domestic jurispru-
dence has on various occasions been confirmed in Strasbourg case law even 
though it has sometimes given rise to conflicting approaches.31 
At a national level, the HRA has introduced important innovations in the 
domestic constitutional order. The Act has added to the number of statutes 
which have been recognized a ‘constitutional status’ in so far as they condition 
the relationship between citizen and state in an overarching manner or the 
scope of what are now regarded as fundamental constitutional rights. The pro-
visions of these statutes can be repealed or limited in their scope only by the 
express intention of Parliament (they are ‘immune’ from implied repeal).32 
                                                 
29  See A. KAVANAGH, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act, Cam-
bridge, 2009. 
30  See C. GEARTY, The Human Rights Act - An Academic Sceptic Changes his Mind but 
not his Heart, in E.H.R.L.R., 2010, 582 ss. Contra K. D. EWING, Bonfire of the Lib-
erties: New Labour, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Oxford, 2010. See also R. 
BELLAMY, Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act, in Int. Jnl. of Con-
stitutional Law, 2011, 86 ss., arguing that the HRA normative scheme and the judi-
cial practice developing under the Act can be read as reinforcing relevant features of 
the political constitutionalism paradigm.  
31  M. AMOS, The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the United Kingdom’s Perform-
ance before the European Court of Human Rights, in P.L., 2007, 655 ss.; Id, The 
principle of comity and the relationship between British courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights, cit.; N. BRATZA, The relationship between the UK courts 
and Strasbourg, in E.H.R.L.R., 2011, 505 ss. For a critical example of a diverging 
approach, see the Grand Chamber’s judgment on 7 July 2011 in the case of Al-Jedda 
v. United Kingdom concerning the delicate context of the United Kingdom’s partici-
pation in the Multi-National Force operations in Iraq. 
32  Cfr. Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151, cit., Laws LJ par. 62: “In 
the present state of its maturity the common law has come to recognise that there ex-
ist rights which should properly be classified as constitutional or fundamental…And 
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More importantly, the Act has affected the evolving meaning of the principles 
of the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law, and their mutual interac-
tion. As Bogdanor says, the HRA while formally leaving intact the sovereignty 
of Parliament, has put “some pressure upon it”, and has enhanced the weight 
and relevance of the rule of law as a competitive constitutional principle.33 
The Act has introduced a judicial supervision of the acts of Parliament 
which endows courts with considerable means of control. A compliant con-
struction under section 3 permits an immediately corrective intervention on a 
provision conflicting with fundamental rights. A declaration of incompatibil-
ity, though a weaker form of review than the American model, constitutes a 
statement of legal principles which Parliament and Government cannot ignore 
without endangering the balance of institutional powers and exposing the State 
to responsibilities at an international level. Such declarations have so far ex-
erted decisive pressure on Government to adopt the remedial measures re-
quired to overcome Convention rights incompatibilities.34  
By confronting Government with the legal and principled restraints that the 
Convention rights impose on political action, these instruments have at times 
overexposed the judiciary in the context of public debate over critical political 
and social issues. More generally, the Human Rights Act, by entrusting courts 
with the responsibility to ensure the protection of Convention rights at a na-
tional level, has enriched their role and given it more visibility. 
The HRA nevertheless suffers from certain limitations, which were in part 
implicit in its genesis and normative scheme. In particular, from the very be-
ginning, the HRA presented an ambiguity in its underlying purposes and this 
ambiguity has cast its shadow throughout the applicative history of the Act. 
In the political debate leading to the enactment of the HRA, the incorpora-
tion of the European Convention was regarded by its promoters as a first step 
towards the subsequent adoption of a new “home-grown” Bill of Rights.35 This 
                                                                                                                                                     
from this a further insight follows. We should recognize a hierarchy of Acts of Par-
liament: as it were ‘ordinary’ statutes and ‘constitutional’ statutes. The two catego-
ries must be distinguished on a principled basis. In my opinion a constitutional stat-
ute is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen and state in 
some general, overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what 
we would now regard as fundamental constitutional rights”. 
33  V. BOGDANOR, op.cit., 74. On the relationship between the principle of parliamen-
tary sovereignty and the rule of law in the HRA age see Jackson v. Attorney-General 
[2006] 1 AC 262. 
34  On these aspects see extensively A. KAVANAGH, Constitutional Review cit. 
35  See A New Agenda for Democracy, London, Labour Party, 1993 and Bringing Rights 
Home, London, Labour Party, 1996. See also the initiatives of Liberty and the Insti-
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objective was later abandoned in the 1997 Labour Manifesto. Nevertheless, 
since its inception, the HRA has been promoted in academic36 and judicial37 
circles as a domestic Charter of fundamental rights, i.e. a constitutional meas-
ure entrusting the courts with the mission to develop a national constitutional 
rights jurisprudence. The context of its adoption, the normative scheme and the 
applicative practice, show that the Act, whilst succeeding in its instrumental 
function of ensuring the domestic protection of Convention rights, fell short of 
adequately fulfilling this ‘national vocation’.38 
From the first stages of its life, the HRA suffered from a lack of that popular 
involvement and understanding which a major constitutional measure is ex-
pected to enjoy. The public lack of knowledge and clarity regarding its purposes 
and operation has given rise to widespread misconceptions by the general public 
concerning its effects, especially on the administration of justice and the ability 
to ensure national security, and rendered the Act more vulnerable to repeated 
attacks by prominent political exponents hostile to the restraints that the Conven-
tion guarantees impose on political action, and by sectors of the media con-
cerned that the HRA would work as a vehicle for extending privacy rights under 
art. 8 of the EHRC, while restricting their prerogatives and interests.39 
Furthermore, the normative scheme is not fully consistent with the purpose 
of endowing the United Kingdom with a Charter of fundamental rights. The 
range of rights protected is limited in comparison to more modern instruments 
of rights protection, reflecting the range covered by the 1950 European Con-
vention and leaving out newly emergent rights such as the protection of per-
sonal data and environmental rights. The operative provisions of the Act seem 
mainly intended to give effect to Article 1 of the Convention (the obligation of 
contracting Parties to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the freedoms 
and rights provided for in the Convention) and reproduce at a domestic level 
the same parameters of protection which the Strasbourg system ensures. Sec-
tions 7(7) and 8(4) are telling in this respect, the former prescribing the same 
criteria for standing as article 34 ECHR (criteria which are more restrictive 
than those developed by the courts in the context of judicial review proceed-
                                                                                                                                                     
tute of Public Policy Research in F. KLUG, A People’s Charter: Liberty’s Bill of 
Rights, Liberty, 1991; A. LESTER et al., A British Bill of Rights, IPPR, 1991. 
36  See in particular F. KLUG, A Bill of Rights: Do We Need One or Do We Already 
Have One?, in P.L., 2007, 701 ss. 
37  See T. HICKMAN, Public Law after the Human Rights Act, Oxford, 2010, 40 ss. 
38  S. SONELLI, La tutela dei diritti fondamentali nell’ordinamento inglese: lo Human 
Rights Act 1998 e oltre, Torino, 2010, 210 ss. 
39  Cfr. M. AMOS, Problems with the Human Rights Act 1998 and How to Remedy 
Them: is a Bill of Rights the Answer?, in M.L.R., 2009, 883 ss.  
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ings), the latter referring to the criteria laid down in article 41 ECHR with re-
gard to compensation. 
Case law under the Act has confirmed and even reinforced the specular re-
lationship between the national and the supranational levels of protection; until 
recently the ‘mirror principle’ not only prevailed in the application of section 2 
limiting the opportunity for the development of a domestic jurisprudence on 
fundamental rights, but also inspired the interpretative approach to other provi-
sions of the Act.40 As has been recently asserted, “the first ten years of the Act 
undoubtedly witnessed the dominance of the international/pragmatic/remedial 
over the domestic/constitutional perspectives”.41 
The solutions to these problems do not necessarily imply the replacement of 
the HRA with a new domestic instrument.42 They could be addressed through 
other means, such as promoting a better understanding of the HRA mechanism 
and effects, and enacting minor statutory reforms or amendments to the Act 
(for example, by extending the range of rights protected). Nonetheless, the po-
litical debate has moved in a different direction: that of resuming the project of 
a national Charter of Human Rights. 
IV. The Political Debate Over a New Bill of Rights 
The case for a new Bill of Rights was raised again in the political arena after 
the first years of HRA operation, in tones infused with nationalist rhetoric.43  
In a speech delivered at the Centre for Policy Studies in June 2006, David 
Cameron, at that time leader of the opposition, strongly criticized the HRA as 
having an adverse impact on tackling crime and terrorism and helping to “create 
a culture of rights without responsibilities”. He pledged to repeal the Act if the 
Conservative party won the next election, and to replace it with an entrenched 
British Bill of Rights, which would enshrine “the core values” of the national 
community and strike the proper balance between rights and responsibilities. In 
Cameron’s view, the existence of such a Bill of Rights would enhance the de-
velopment of a domestic jurisprudence on human rights and “tend to lead the 
                                                 
40  Such as s. 8 HRA: see Greenfield v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2005] 1 WLR 673. 
41  T. HICKMAN, Public Law, cit., 30, although recognizing an increasing influence of 
the latter. 
42  See M. AMOS, Problems with the Human Rights Act 1998, cit., 900 ss. 
43  Cfr. C. HARVEY, Taking the Next Step? Achieving another Bill of Rights?, in 
E.H.R.L.R., 2011, 24 ss. 
 12 
European Court of Human Rights to apply the ‘margin of appreciation’”.44 
In July 2007 the Labour Government published a Green Paper on constitu-
tional reform, where a process of inclusive national debate was announced to 
consider the adoption of a written constitution and a Bill of Rights providing a 
“clearer articulation of British values”.45 
For their part, the Liberal Democrats restated their commitment to an “en-
trenched constitution” including a Bill of Rights that would build on the HRA 
and extend its scope of protection.46 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights47 participated in the 
debate issuing a report in August 2009 in which the Committee favoured the 
adoption of a Bill of Rights which would add “more generously defined in-
digenous rights”48 to the range guaranteed by the European Convention, and 
suggested the main features and content of a possible new instrument.49  
                                                 
44 Balancing freedom and security - a modern British Bill of Rights, 26 June 2006: 
<http//www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/>. 
45  The Governance of Britain CM 7170, July 2007, par. 198. In the same year 
JUSTICE published a report which includes a comparative survey on human rights 
codifications and models of judicial review: A British Bill of Rights. Informing the 
Debate, London, JUSTICE, 2007. 
46  For the People, by the People Liberal Democrat Policy Paper 83, 14, par. 4.2.4: 
<http://www.libdems.org.uk/>. 
47  See Joint Committee on Human Rights - Twenty Ninth Report of Session 2007-08, A 
Bill of Rights for the UK?, HL 165-I/HC 150-I. The Joint Committee on Human 
Rights was established in the first parliamentary session of 2000 with the task of 
considering questions relating to human rights in the United Kingdom and more par-
ticularly, with the duty to review the Government proposals of remedial orders un-
der s. 10 HRA. The Committee has included among its priorities the “legislative 
scrutiny” of proposed legislation, the formulation of reports on the issue of human 
rights protection, the review of Government action in response to domestic courts’ 
declarations of incompatibility or ECtHR’s decisions against the UK. On the 
JCHR’s role and activity see A. LESTER, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation Un-
der the Human Rights Act 1998, in E.H.R.L.R., 2002, 432 ss.; F. KLUG, H. 
WILLDBORE, Breaking New Ground: The Joint Committee on Human Rights and The 
Role of Parliament in Human Rights Compliance, in E.H.R.L.R., 2007, 231 ss. 
48 Ibidem, par. 56. 
49  The JCHR’s proposal preserves most of the features of the ‘parliamentary model’ 
represented by the HRA, such as the ‘ordinary’ nature of the legislative instrument, 
the interpretative obligations, and the declaration of incompatibility (see chapter 7) 
while addressing its major limitations (lack of popular involvement and deliberation, 
limited range of rights protected, excessive specularity with the supranational sys-
tem): see in particular chapters 4, 5, 6, 12.  
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The theme of “duties” was further discussed in the Green Paper Rights and 
Responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework published by the 
Ministry of Justice in March 2009. The document submits that duties are not 
given the same prominence as rights in the constitutional architecture and in 
the general public perception, and expresses the conviction that some respon-
sibilities are so crucial to the functioning of society that they deserve an “ele-
vated constitutional status”. The Green Paper also advocates the inclusion of 
new rights and principles (such as the principle of equality, principles of good 
administration, and children’s rights) and a range of welfare entitlements (to 
healthcare, housing, education). The document does not take a clear position 
on the legal status and the effects the Bill should have, restricting itself to out-
lining a number of possible options.50 
During the 2010 electoral campaign the Conservatives reiterated their will to 
repeal the HRA and replace it with a domestic Bill of Rights51, while Labour52 
and the Liberal Democrats expressed their commitment to “protect” the HRA.53 
V. Towards a UK Bill of Rights?  
As is well known, the general election of May 2010 led to a coalition Govern-
ment of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The Parties tried to reconcile 
their divergent views on the future of human rights protection in their Pro-
gramme for Government.54 In this, the coalition announced the establishment of 
a Commission entrusted “to investigate the creation of a Bill of Rights that in-
corporates and builds on the obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, ensures that these rights continue to be enshrined in British law, 
and protects and extends British Liberties”, and affirmed the purpose of promot-
ing “a better understanding of the true scope of these obligations and liberties”. 
The Commission was finally established on 18 March 2011.55 It is made up of 
                                                 
50  Rights and Responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework, CM 7577, 
March 2009. See the response to the Green Paper by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission: HRA plus: Human Rights for 21st-century Britain, London, EHRC, 
2010. 
51  Conservative Party Manifesto 2010, 79. 
52  The Labour Party Manifesto 2010, 9:3. 
53  Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010, 94. The purpose of introducing an entrenched 
written Constitution was also restated in the document.  
54  The Coalition: our programme for government – Freedom, Fairness, Responsibility, 
London, HMG, 2010, 11. 
55  See Ministerial Statement HC Deb 18 March 2011 c 32WS. 
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nine members, seven of whom are from the Bar, and is almost equally divided 
between “Human Rights Act supporters” and “Human Rights Act sceptics”.56 
According to its terms of reference, the Commission has the task not only 
of investigating the feasibility of a Bill of Rights, but also of providing interim 
advice to the Government on possible reforms of the Strasbourg Court, ahead 
of and following the assumption by the United Kingdom of the Chairmanship 
of the Council of Europe from November 2011.57 The Commission is expected 
to report back no later than the end of 2012. 
To date, the Commission has advanced a number of considerations on the 
main objectives to be achieved and on its methods of work,58 and has launched 
a programme of consultation.59 In particular, the Commission has pointed out 
the need to ensure public engagement with its work, to recognize the common 
law heritage and its role in the context of human rights protection and to con-
sider the respective roles that Parliament, Government and the Courts should 
                                                 
56  On the side of “HRA sceptics”: Jonathan Fisher QC, Martin Howe QC, Anthony 
Speaight QC, who have all contributed to the pamphlet of the Society of Conserva-
tive Lawyers A Modern Bill of Rights published in 2006 (see <http://www.conser 
vativelawyers.com/>), and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, President of the International 
Political Science Association’s research committee on political finance and political 
corruption and author of the pamphlet Bringing Rights Back Home. Making human 
rights compatible with parliamentary democracy in the UK, Policy Exchange, 2011, 
discussing the hypothesis of withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Human Rights. On the side of “HRA supporters”: Lady Helena Kennedy QC, 
chair of the Justice Council, Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC, generally recognized as 
one of the main “authors” of the HRA, and Philippe Sands QC, Professor of Law 
and Director of the Centre on International Courts and Tribunals at University Col-
lege London. The other members of the Commission are Sir Leigh Lewis, chair of 
the Commission and former Permanent Secretary to the Department of Work and 
Pensions, and David Edward QC, Professor Emeritus of the University of Edinburgh 
and former Judge of the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice. 
57  The interim advice was published on 8 September 2011. See the Commission’s web-
site: <http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/cbr/index.htm/>. 
58  See Minutes of the meeting of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, 6 May 2011 on 
the Commission’s website. 
59  This consultation programme will involve the general public, interested organiza-
tions, the judiciary, and devolved institutions: see the Commission’s website. To this 
end, the Commission has issued a discussion paper, Do we need a Bill of Rights?. 
The paper has attracted numerous responses, including: University of Cambridge 
Centre of Public Law: Submission to Commission on a Bill of Rights, November 
2011; Equality and Human Rights Commission, The case for the Human Rights Act, 
November 2011, which underlines the need to uphold the principle of “non-
regression” (with regard to the HRA mechanism, range of rights and level of protec-
tion) in any future process of adopting a UK Bill of Rights. 
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play in that field. The Commission has also underlined the need to evaluate 
fully the implications of the devolution settlements in its work and to consult 
with the devolved institutions. As for the possible content of a new Bill of 
Rights, the Commission points out the need to consider whether a different 
balance of existing rights could or should be achieved (significantly mention-
ing Articles 8 and 10 ECHR), whether the range of protected rights could or 
should be updated and expanded by including in any UK Bill of Rights addi-
tional rights (such as the right to jury trial, habeas corpus, a right to equal pro-
tection of the law, a right to administrative justice) and whether responsibili-
ties, besides rights, should be included in the terms of the Bill. 
Since its announcement in the coalition program, the establishment of the 
Commission has caused a considerable debate among commentators. It has 
been argued that such an initiative does not enjoy sufficient popular interest 
and support while protracted uncertainty on the future of the HRA is likely to 
have a “chilling effect” on its implementation.60 This problem is exacerbated 
by the recent continuous assaults the Act and the European Court itself have 
been undergoing from the media and exponents of the Government.61 The di-
vergency in its members ideological and political provenance has raised further 
diffidence regarding the Commission’s ability to work.62 In two audiences be-
fore the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee, the members of 
the Commission endeavoured to reassure the public on their real will to work 
together without prejudice on the object of their mandate. 
Admittedly, several of the issues the Commission will have to deal with are 
                                                 
60  A. DONALD, A Bill of Rights for the UK? Why the process matters, in E.H.R.L.R., 
2010, 459 ss., 459 and 460. See also D. ERDOS, Smoke but No Fire? The Politics of a 
‘British Bill of Rights’, in 81 The Political Quarterly, 2010, 188 ss., written before 
the general election, discussing the different options the main political parties face 
with regard to human rights policy, and focusing on the “constitutional smoke” op-
tion where “both parties’utility have, and continue to be, best served by promoting 
lengthy and inconclusive public debate on these issues, followed by, at most, rela-
tively cosmetic change”: at 188. 
61  See N. BRATZA, The relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg, cit. See 
also the current debate on prisoners’ right to vote: S. BRIANT, Dialogue, diplomacy 
and defiance: prisoners' voting rights at home and in Strasbourg, in E.H.R.L.R. 
2011, 243 ss. 
62  The Commission has been described as “deadlocked from the start”, as not having a 
“snowball’s chance in hell of coming to an agreed conclusion”: A. TRAVIS, P. 
WINTOUR, Deadlock likely on commission pondering a British bill of rights, in The 
Guardian, 18 March 2011: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/mar/18/deadlock-
bill-of-rights-commission/>; R. SMITH, The state of human rights, 10 June 2011: 
<http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/>. 
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exacting and complex. The terms of reference say nothing about the place a 
possible Bill of Rights should take in the existing constitutional framework, 
nor do they contemplate the process of creating a Bill of Rights as part of a 
wider process of constitutional renewal.63 The issue of the relationship be-
tween a UK Bill of Rights and the various international human rights instru-
ments binding the United Kingdom will have to be addressed, especially as far 
as the content is concerned.64 
The implications of a Charter of Rights on devolution settlements are also 
critical, as a report by JUSTICE, one of the most eminent organizations in the 
field of human rights, has recently pointed out.65 The HRA applies in the differ-
ent devolved components of the United Kingdom. Specific provisions of the 
devolution statutes prevent their legislative institutions from modifying it.66 
Moreover, both legislative and executive devolved institutions are bound to act 
in a way which is compatible with Convention rights.67 Thus, the HRA and the 
devolution statutes concur in ensuring the protection of human rights in the 
United Kingdom: the range of rights protected is the same in the individual 
components of the UK, as are many of the mechanism’s features.68 This implies 
that the adoption of a new UK Bill of Rights in place of the HRA or in addition 
to it, would also require amendments to the devolution statutes, a course which 
would be likely to require the consent of the devolved Assemblies.69 
The relationship between human rights legislation and devolution is par-
ticularly delicate with regard to Northern Ireland. Firstly, the UK Bill of Rights 
debate may hinder or stall the ongoing process toward the adoption of a spe-
cific Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland required by the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement (GFA) of April 1998, with the effect of breaching the obligations 
arising from that instrument.70 Secondly, a Charter of Rights aimed at repre-
                                                 
63  As the Liberal Democrats have always intended. See also R. GORDON, Reparing 
British Politics: a Blueprint for Constitutional Change, Oxford, 2010. 
64  Cfr. Philippe Sands, in Corrected Transcript of Oral Evidence to be published as HC 
1049-ii. 
65  Devolution and Human Rights, London, JUSTICE, February 2010. See also C. 
HARVEY, Taking the Next Step?, cit., 39 ss. 
66  Schedule 4 SA, s. 7(1)(b) NIA “entrenched enactments”. 
67  S. 29(2)(d) e 57(2) SA; s. 6(2)(c) e 24(1)(a) NIA; s. 94 e 81(1) GWA 2006. Section 
21(1) HRA defines the Acts of the Scottish Parliament and the Acts of the Parlia-
ment of Northern Ireland as “subordinate legislation”, and as such liable to be disap-
plied by courts if incompatible with Convention rights. 
68  Cfr. Devolution and Human Rights, cit., para 14 ss. 
69  Ibidem. 
70  The GFA is not only a peace agreement between rival factions but also a bilateral 
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senting the whole United Kingdom may inflame nationalist feelings in North-
ern Ireland. Likewise, a UK Bill of Rights may antagonize nationalist feelings 
that already exist in Scotland.71 
As the JUSTICE report points out, the HRA has been accepted without par-
ticular difficulties in the devolution context, partly because it “reflects wider 
international and regional human rights standards that all the communities can 
agree to be bound by”.72 The politics of incorporating a supranational instru-
ment through the HRA has had a ‘neutralizing’ effect on nationalist feelings 
while at the same time ensuring a common framework of rights acting as a 
point of reference for the new devolved institutions.73 
The formulation and adoption of a Bill of Rights implies a process of na-
tional identity definition;74 this process is particularly delicate for the United 
                                                                                                                                                     
treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. The Agreement re-
quires the creation of a Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) 
whose competences include the duty to advise the Secretary of State on the content 
of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland “to reflect the particular circumstances of 
Northern Ireland”: see s. 69(7) of the Northern Ireland Act giving effect to the GFA. 
The established NIHRC produced its report on 10 December 2008 after years of 
lengthy consultations throughout the country. Most of the NIHRC’s recommenda-
tions have been rejected by the Northern Ireland Office on the basis that the rights 
proposed were not specific to the circumstances of Northern Ireland and might be 
better addressed as part of the debate over a UK Bill of Rights. By contrast, the Irish 
Government has stated that the UK obligations towards the Republic of Ireland un-
der the GFA imply the adoption of a specific Northern Ireland Bill of Rights: see 
Devolution and Human Rights, cit., para 84 ss. On the NIHRC’s work see C. 
HARVEY, D. RUSSELL, A new beginning for human rights protection in Northern Ire-
land?, in E.H.R.L.R. 2009, 748 ss. 
71  Devolution and Human Rights, at para 97 ss. On the diversity of national identities in 
the UK see the monographic issue The Politics of Britishness, no. 63(2) Parliamentary 
Affairs, 2010, 223 ss. 
72 Devolution and Human Rights, cit., para 102. In its conclusion, the Report expresses 
serious concerns about the consequences of abandoning the point of equilibrium the 
HRA represents: “The HRA works, and at present the devolution framework has 
also been successful. Amendments to the HRA or legislating for a bill of rights 
would be dangerous and risky – to the protection of rights, to the constitution of the 
UK, and to the Union itself”: op. cit., para 112. 
73  As acknowledged in the same context of the parliamentary debates leading to the 
adoption of the HRA: see Select Committee of the House of Lords on A Bill of 
Rights, 1978, HL Paper n. 176, 30 ss. 
74  Cfr. Joint Committee on Human Rights, cit., para 15. For a critical assessment of 
alternative models of constitutional design in societies divided by competing nation-
alisms see A. SCHWARTZ, Patriotism or integrity? Constitutional community in di-
vided societies, in O.J.L.S., 2011, 503 ss. 
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Kingdom. It will be necessary to give serious consideration to the issues and 
implications involved and evaluate whether the project can achieve the degree 
of political and popular consensus indispensable to render a new Bill of Rights 
an instrument of cohesion rather than an instrument of divergence among the 
national communities involved. 
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